Massachusetts Children in Need of Services: Trapped by the Legacy of \u3ci\u3eIsaac\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eJeremy\u3c/i\u3e by Wilkinson, Eleanor L
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 7
1-1-2008
Massachusetts Children in Need of Services:
Trapped by the Legacy of Isaac and Jeremy
Eleanor L. Wilkinson
wilkinel@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Juveniles Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eleanor L. Wilkinson, Massachusetts Children in Need of Services: Trapped by the Legacy of Isaac and
Jeremy, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 239 (2008), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol28/iss1/7
239 
MASSACHUSETTS CHILDREN IN NEED OF 
SERVICES: TRAPPED BY THE LEGACY OF 
ISAAC AND JEREMY 
Eleanor L. Wilkinson* 
Abstract: In 1995, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts severely 
limited the power of courts to review Department of Social Services 
(DSS) decisions regarding children in its care, in companion cases Care 
and Protection of Isaac and Care and Protection of Jeremy. All Massachusetts 
children in DSS’ care are affected by these cases. Isaac and Jeremy may 
conflict with the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, which mandates 
regular review of out-of-home placements for children. In addition, these 
decisions disproportionately affect children of color. To protect the in-
terests of children in DSS care, the negative impact of Isaac and Jeremy 
must be addressed by judicially or legislatively overruling them. Other 
states provide useful statutory examples of addressing this problem. 
Introduction 
 On March 6, 2005, four-year-old Dontel Jeffers arrived at a hospital 
having already been dead for three hours.1 Dontel died from one of the 
two major internal injuries he received in the home of his foster mother; 
his small intestine had been pushed into his spine, causing a hemor-
rhage one to two days before he died, and a bone inside his throat had 
been bruised, “indicat[ing] ‘forceful squeezing of the child’s neck.’”2 At 
the time of his death, Dontel had been living in his foster home for 
eleven days.3 The Department of Social Services (DSS) had selected this 
foster home for him.4 
 When Dontel was an infant, his mother left him in his father’s 
care.5 When his father was deported, a judge granted custody to Don-
                                                                                                                        
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2007–2008). 
1 Mac Daniel, Injuries Detailed in Boy’s Death, Boston Globe, Oct. 4, 2005, at B2; John 
Ellement, Prosecutor Says Boy Was Dead at Least 3 Hours, Boston Globe, July 2, 2005, at A1. 
2 Daniel, supra note 1 (quoting Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney David A. De-
akin). 
3 Ellement, supra note 1. 
4 Id. DSS is the state child welfare organization. 
5 Patricia Wen, After One Life Turns Around, Another Is Lost, Boston Globe, July 4, 2005, 
at B1. 
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tel’s mother despite her suspected cocaine use.6 Not long after, DSS 
discovered Dontel’s mother’s cocaine use and removed him from her 
care, charging her with neglect.7 Thereafter, DSS placed Dontel in 
Bridge Home, a residential facility where children are evaluated for 
problems after abuse or neglect, for three months.8 Following his stay 
at Bridge Home, DSS placed Dontel in the home of a foster mother, 
despite repeated requests from his grandmother that she be allowed to 
care for him.9 The twenty-four-year-old foster mother was supposed to 
provide Dontel with therapeutic care.10 While she had previously taken 
in adolescent foster children, she had never worked with a young 
child.11 The consequences were tragic: Dontel died and the foster 
mother was indicted on a charge of second-degree murder.12 
 Because Dontel was in DSS custody, his placement could only be 
reviewed by a court for legal error or abuse of discretion.13 The out-
come of Dontel’s case clearly demonstrates why his placement with the 
foster mother was unsafe: the foster mother had never worked with a 
young child, she was very young herself, and based on Dontel’s injuries 
she treated him in a violent manner.14 DSS’ selected foster home for 
Dontel was dangerous, and the fact that the courts were powerless to 
review that decision is troubling.15 If a court had had an opportunity to 
review DSS’ placement, perhaps it could have corrected the situation. 
Dontel’s grandmother was willing and able to provide kinship care for 
him; a court could have taken advantage of that option and placed 
Dontel with her.16 But regardless of the specifics of Dontel’s case, the 
court should have had the authority to review evidence and make a 
                                                                                                                        
6 Id. The court could have given custody of Dontel to his grandmother, but chose his 
mother despite her drug problem. See id. 
7 John Ellement & Patricia Wen, Foster Mother Charged in Death of Boy, 4, Boston Globe, 
July 1, 2005, at A1; Wen, supra note 5. 
8 Ellement & Wen, supra note 7. 
9 Id. DSS apparently felt that Dontel would benefit from a therapeutic foster home, 
rather than being with his grandmother. Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Wen, supra note 5. 
12 Suzanne Smalley, Another Charged in Foster Death, Boston Globe, Aug. 23, 2005, at B1. 
Corinne Stephen was convicted of involuntary manslaughter on November 16, 2007. Brian 
R. Ballou, Jury Convicts Foster Mother, Boston Globe, Nov. 17, 2007, at B1. 
13 See Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995). 
14 See Daniel, supra note 1. 
15 See id. 
16 See Ellement & Wen, supra note 7. 
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determination to provide Dontel with the healthiest, safest possible 
placement and to take into consideration his long-term well-being.17 
 The juvenile court could not review DSS’ decision in Dontel’s case 
because Massachusetts courts are generally precluded from reviewing 
such DSS choices.18 In 1995, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) issued companion decisions, Care and Protection of Isaac and Care 
and Protection of Jeremy, which bolstered the authority of DSS over chil-
dren in its care.19 These decisions severely limited the power of juve-
nile courts over children in DSS custody by limiting judicial over-
sight.20 The juvenile courts may only review DSS decisions for abuse of 
discretion under an arbitrary or capricious standard.21 In Massachu-
setts, the juvenile courts and DSS have jurisdiction over “care and pro-
tection” cases, and also over “children in need of services” (CHINS) 
cases.22 Because children in either of these situations may be commit-
ted to DSS, Isaac and Jeremy apply to them.23 
 Massachusetts law does not conform to federal law under the re-
gime created by Isaac and Jeremy. In 1997, Congress passed the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act (ASFA) in an effort to improve permanency 
                                                                                                                        
17 See infra notes 166–70, 192–230, and accompanying text; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
119, § 1 (2004). 
18 See Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034 (Mass. 1995); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1029. 
19 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1034; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1029. 
20 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
21 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
22 See §§ 39E, 51B. When a court receives allegations that a child 
(a) is without necessary and proper physical or educational care and discipline; 
(b) is growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's 
sound character development; (c) lacks proper attention of the parent, guardian 
with care and custody or custodian; or (d) has a parent, guardian or custodian 
who is unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide any such care, 
then the court may summon the parents to determine whether the child is in need of care 
and protection. § 24. CHINS is defined in the statute as 
a child below the age of seventeen who persistently runs away from the home of 
his parents or legal guardian, or persistently refuses to obey the lawful and rea-
sonable commands of his parents or legal guardian, thereby resulting in said 
parent’s or guardian’s inability to adequately care for and protect said child, or a 
child between the ages of six and sixteen who persistently and willfully fails to at-
tend school or persistently violates the lawful and reasonable regulations of his 
school. 
§ 21. 
23 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 39G(c) (2004); Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1039; Jeremy, 646 
N.E.2d at 1033. 
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planning for children out of their parents’ care.24 ASFA includes man-
dates for state child welfare agencies such as DSS, and therefore relates 
to both children in need of care and protection and CHINS.25 ASFA 
requires that hearings regarding permanent placement of these chil-
dren take place earlier and more frequently than its predecessor did; 
hearings now must occur no more than twelve months after the child’s 
initial placement and no less than every twelve months thereafter.26 
These permanency hearings are to include review of the child’s place-
ment by either a court or an administrative body appointed or ap-
proved by the court.27 Federal courts interpreting this provision have 
assumed that such review will include judicial oversight of agency deci-
sions.28 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, however, refuses to al-
low court review of such agency decisions under Isaac and Jeremy.29 
 The failure of Massachusetts law regarding court oversight of DSS 
decisions to comply with federal requirements under AFSA costs the 
Commonwealth much-needed federal funds and disproportionately 
affects children of color.30 Massachusetts has already lost funds due to 
its failure to comply substantially with certain federal requirements 
under ASFA.31 Specifically, its case review system, including the review 
of cases by the court, was an area found not to be in substantial com-
pliance, causing the state to lose significant funding.32 Furthermore, 
the demographics of children in DSS care do not match the demo-
graphics of children in the general population: children of color have 
                                                                                                                        
24 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
25 See id. 
26 See id. § 302, 111 Stat. at 2128. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980 had required that such hearings take place only once every eighteen months. Id. 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000)). 
27 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(C) (2000). 
28 See, e.g., Vt. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 789 
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986); Occean v. Kearney, 123 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Lynch 
v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 355 (D. Mass. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 
(1st Cir. 1983). 
29 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031, 1033. 
30 See notes 158–82 and accompanying text. 
31 See Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Massa-
chusetts Department of Children and Families Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Re-
view 1, 9 (2003) [hereinafter IV-E Review], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/ 
cwmonitoring/final/primary/ma.pdf. 
32 Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Child 
and Family Services Review: Final Assessment: Massachusetts 11 (2001) [hereinafter 
CFSR] (those lacking access to the official report may wish to access it by searching 
google.com using the following search terms: “administration for children and families final 
assessment Massachusetts 2001”). 
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been placed in DSS care in numbers disproportionate to their repre-
sentation in the state’s population as a whole.33 Because such children 
are involved with the system in disproportionate numbers, they bear a 
disproportionate portion of the negative effects of the SJC’s decisions 
in Isaac and Jeremy.34 
 This note will argue that Massachusetts courts should be able to 
force DSS to make appropriate placement decisions for children who 
have been adjudicated CHINS in its custody. In order for courts to 
have such authority, the decisions in Isaac and Jeremy must be over-
ruled, either legislatively or judicially, because these holdings exces-
sively restrict the courts’ control over DSS placement decisions.35 Part I 
will give a brief overview of Isaac and Jeremy, and will explain how they 
apply to CHINS under the Massachusetts status offender law. Part II 
will explore the relevant parts of the Adoption and Safe Families Act as 
well as the federal decisions which have interpreted it; these decisions 
suggest that courts should have the power to review agency decisions. 
Part III will demonstrate the need for a change in the law in light of 
the disproportionate number of children of color involved with DSS, 
and then will examine the intersection between the federal cases and 
Massachusetts’ compliance with ASFA in the context of the CHINS law 
of Massachusetts then. Part IV will lay out potential remedies to the 
problem created by the SJC’s decisions in Isaac and Jeremy. This note 
argues that Isaac and Jeremy should be overruled by the SJC or by the 
Massachusetts state legislature, and looks to statutes in other states for 
possible solutions. 
I. The Cases 
 Isaac and Jeremy were decided on the same day, March 7, 1995, by 
the SJC.36 Both dealt with children who had been committed to the 
custody of DSS in care and protection cases, although Isaac addressed a 
child who had been committed permanently, while in Jeremy the child 
had been committed temporarily.37 In both cases, the court held that 
when children are in the custody of DSS, the department may make 
                                                                                                                        
33 Mass. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Quarterly Report, Fiscal Year 2007, 2nd Quarter 3 
(2007) [hereinafter Quarterly Report]. 
34 See id. 
35 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033; infra notes 71–103, 192–242, 
and accompanying text. 
36 Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1034 (Mass. 1995); Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 
646 N.E.2d 1029, 1029 (Mass. 1995). 
37 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d. at 1036; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030. 
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decisions regarding the “normal incidents of custody,” including “a 
child’s specific place of abode.”38 These decisions significantly limit the 
degree to which courts may oversee such decisions, leaving open the 
possibility that a child may be subjected to such considerations as DSS’ 
funding needs, rather than being placed in an environment which will 
serve his or her best interests.39 Thus Isaac and Jeremy set a dangerous 
precedent for allowing DSS almost free reign over children whom the 
courts have placed in the department’s custody.40 
A. A Limited “Arbitrary and Capricious” Review Standard: Care and 
Protection of Isaac 
 Isaac was one of four siblings, all of whom were adjudicated chil-
dren in need of care and protection by the juvenile court.41 Custody of 
all four children was granted to DSS and Isaac was placed in a residen-
tial school, the Robert F. Kennedy School, on September 4, 1991.42 
Isaac became self-abusive and aggressive, leading to disruptions in the 
school setting.43 Eventually, in September of 1993, the school assigned 
a staff member to work individually with Isaac, but his behavior failed 
to improve under this close supervision.44 On October 15, 1993, he was 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital, but made no progress there either.45 
On November 8, 1993, Isaac’s treating psychiatrist recommended, and 
Isaac’s guardian ad litem (GAL) agreed, that Isaac should return to the 
school and that his behavior should be monitored at all times.46 DSS, 
however, objected that the cost of this change in placement was pro-
hibitive.47 There was a consensus that the school was no longer an ap-
                                                                                                                        
38 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038; see also Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033 (“We have concluded that 
G.L. c. 119 allots to the department the authority to determine the residence of a child 
committed to its custody on a temporary basis.”). 
39 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035 (noting that DSS refused to follow the recommendation 
of Isaac’s treating psychiatrist partly because following it would come at extra expense to 
DSS). 
40 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
41 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035. 
42 Id. at 1035, 1036. Isaac’s older brother was placed at the school with him. Id. 
43 Id. at 1036. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1036. A guardian ad litem is “[a] guardian, [usually] a lawyer, 
appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 725 (8th ed. 2004). 
47 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1036. In general, DSS had ceased funding individual attention, 
such as that recommended for Isaac, in 1990 because of its cost. Id. 
2008] Judicial Review of DSS Decisions in Massachusetts 245 
propriate long-term placement for Isaac.48 Isaac’s GAL wanted him 
transferred to another placement right away, but DSS wanted him to 
remain at the hospital until an alternate long-term placement became 
available.49 The court returned Isaac to the school anyway, with the in-
creased staff supervision.50 
 Although Isaac was eventually placed in a long-term residential 
setting approved by both DSS and the judge, DSS moved to vacate the 
court’s initial order that Isaac be returned to the school with one-on-
one supervision.51 Arguing that it had a statutory mandate which it 
could put into practice whenever it chose, DSS insisted that decisions 
such as placement of a child have an impact on its budget, which is fi-
nite and must be divided among a large group of children.52 
 The trial court denied this motion, although it acknowledged that 
DSS has primary responsibility for these types of decisions.53 According 
to the judge, courts do have discretion to resolve disputes between DSS 
and other parties regarding the residential placements of children in 
DSS custody.54 This authority includes the ability to dictate specific 
placements for the children based on consideration of chapter 119 of 
the General Laws in its entirety.55 In 1995, the SJC disagreed.56 
 On appeal, the SJC stated that the issue in this case was the degree 
of control the care and protection statute gives to a judge reviewing a 
DSS decision regarding the residential placement of a child in DSS cus-
tody.57 The court held that separation of powers dictated against courts 
attempting to exercise the functions of executive agencies.58 Courts 
can order an agency to do anything it is legally obligated to do, but 
where an agency chooses how it will fulfill that obligation courts may 
not dictate the means.59 If there is only one possible way for an agency 
to fulfill a mandate, then the court may order it to take that step.60 
                                                                                                                        
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1035–36. 
51 See id. at 1036 & n.2. 
52 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1036–37. 
53 See id. at 1037. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. Chapter 119 is entitled “Protection and Care of Children, and Proceedings Against 
Them.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119 (2004). 
56 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1037. 
57 Id. at 1038. The case came to the SJC after a single justice heard the case and re-
ported it to the full court. Id. at 1036. 
58 Id. at 1037. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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 More specifically, Isaac had been placed in the permanent custody 
of DSS, so decisions “related to normal incidents of custody . . . [were] 
committed to the discretion of the department” by statute, which in-
cluded power to make decisions regarding the child’s place of resi-
dence.61 Although such decisions are subject to judicial review, the SJC 
held that it would be inappropriate to engage in a de novo examina-
tion of the case.62 Instead, such agency decisions may be reviewed only 
for error of law or abuse of discretion under an “‘arbitrary or capri-
cious’” test.63 The court laid out three factors for determining when an 
agency decision qualifies as arbitrary or capricious: whether the deci-
sion interferes with a goal of reuniting a child with his or her biologi-
cal parents; whether the agency has given appropriate consideration to 
maintaining relationships with siblings and other family members; and 
whether the department has complied with its own regulations in mak-
ing the decision in question.64 
 The SJC also laid out guidelines for how lower courts should han-
dle challenges to DSS decisions regarding placement of children in its 
custody.65 The court noted that although there is often a superfluity of 
information, if a judge deems it necessary, she may ask for additional 
evidence.66 DSS must then produce evidence supporting its decision 
regarding the child’s residential placement.67 The party challenging 
DSS’ action has the burden of proving that DSS did not comply with 
the law or that it abused its discretion.68 This ruling places a significant 
encumbrance on the child or the parent dissatisfied with DSS’ choice, 
who will then be left to fight against a powerful bureaucracy.69 Had the 
SJC decided that trial courts could order DSS to place children in spe-
cific settings, the court would then have been free to follow the rec-
                                                                                                                        
61 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d. at 1038. 
62 See id. at 1039. 
63 See id. (quoting Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 930 (Mass. 1983)). 
64 Id. at 1041. Although the court mentions agency regulations, it does not mention statu-
tory requirements. See id. The court may have overlooked federal mandates, such as those 
included in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, ASFA’s predecessor. Compare id. 
with discussion infra notes 112–126 and accompanying text. This oversight supports the notion 
that Isaac and Jeremy should be overruled either legislatively or judicially, since the SJC failed to 
take account of something so fundamental as federal law. See discussion infra notes 192–242 
and accompanying text. 
65 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See, e.g., Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030–31. 
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ommendations of Isaac’s GAL, the person best qualified to determine 
what setting would best serve Isaac’s needs.70 
B. Further Limits on Court Authority and An Invitation for Change: Care 
and Protection of Jeremy 
 On September 29, 1993, DSS filed a care and protection petition 
for Jeremy and two of his siblings.71 The court gave DSS temporary cus-
tody of the children.72 Jeremy initially resided with the former foster 
sister of his father, but when she moved to Florida in December 1993, 
Jeremy was moved to a foster home.73 From this point on, he was 
moved from one foster home to another because of his aggressive and 
disruptive behavior.74 It was not until March 17, 1994, that DSS sought 
permission from the court to look for a long-term residential program 
for Jeremy.75 Jeremy’s attorney and his father both objected to such a 
placement and argued for specialized foster care, a less restrictive set-
ting.76 While this issue was in debate, Jeremy was placed in two differ-
ent short-term residential facilities.77 On June 7, 1994, the court finally 
entered an order for DSS to place Jeremy in specialized foster care 
while waiting for the conclusion of the hearing on placement, which 
had been ongoing.78 Although DSS attempted to do so, it was appar-
ently unable to find a specialized foster home for Jeremy, and it moved 
for relief and to vacate the order.79 The judge denied these motions, 
but granted DSS more time to place the child.80 Jeremy was eventually 
moved to a long-term residential facility.81 
 A single justice of the SJC vacated the order, declaring that the 
trial judge had “improperly substituted her ‘view of what is in the best 
interest of the child for that of the [d]epartment.’”82 Jeremy, through 
                                                                                                                        
70 See Prob. & Fam. Ct. Standing Order 1-05 (The purpose of a GAL is to “gather and 
report factual information that will assist the court in making custody, visitation, or other 
decisions related to the welfare of a child.”). 
71 Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030 & n.3. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031 n.5. 
82 Id. at 1030–31 (quoting trial court). 
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his attorney, and his father both appealed, but the SJC affirmed the 
single justice’s order.83 
 The court began its opinion by citing Isaac, once again holding that 
DSS decisions are only reviewable for abuse of discretion under an arbi-
trary or capricious test.84 The court supported this deference to the 
agency by discussing the construction of the care and protection stat-
ute.85 It noted that although some parts of it appeared to give a judge 
the power to make placement decisions, others did not and, taken as a 
whole, the statute left the authority to DSS.86 For example, courts are 
authorized to transfer custody of a child to DSS, a licensed agency, or an 
individual foster family in an emergency situation.87 Similarly, where a 
child is removed from his or her parents during the pendency of a care 
and protection proceeding, the court may place the child in a foster 
family, licensed agency, or in the custody of DSS.88 Within this range of 
options, however, courts may not require a child to be placed in a spe-
cific residential setting.89 Although children should generally be placed 
in foster homes, if the child is in need of specialized care, treatment, or 
education, he or she should be placed in a residential facility.90 The 
court held that such decisions are at the discretion of DSS.91 
 The SJC rejected arguments under section 26(2), which outlines 
options for courts.92 Section 26(2) states that whether a court chooses to 
give custody to a foster parent, an agency, or DSS, such a decision may 
be subject to conditions and limitations set by the court.93 The SJC, 
however, read this provision in such a way that, in the context of the 
statute as a whole, it could not be viewed as granting judges authority to 
override a reasonable DSS decision under sections 24 and 25 of the 
same statute.94 Section 24 states that if there is an emergency situation 
and it is necessary to protect the child from severe abuse or neglect, “the 
                                                                                                                        
83 Id. at 1031. 
84 Id. In Isaac, the court had stated that “‘review’ requires, in the context of judicial con-
sideration of an administrative decision, a reexamination of an agency’s actions, and not a 
de novo consideration of the merits of the parties’ positions.” Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1039; see 
supra notes 63–62 and accompanying text. 
85 See Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031–33. 
86 See id. 
87 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 24 (2004); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031–33. 
88 § 25; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031–33. 
89 See Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031. 
90 § 32. 
91 Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031. 
92 See § 26(2); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1032. 
93 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 26(2) (2004); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1032–33. 
94 See Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1032. 
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court may issue an emergency order transferring custody of the child to 
the department or to a licensed child care agency or individual.”95 Sec-
tion 25 states that the court is to hold a hearing and that pending such a 
hearing the court has similar options with regard to a child’s placement: 
“the court may allow the child to be placed in the care of some suitable 
person or licensed agency providing foster care for children or the child 
may be committed to the custody of the department, pending a hearing 
on said petition.”96 It bears noting that the options of placing a child 
with either foster parents or an agency are set in opposition to the op-
tion of placing the child in DSS custody by the use of the word “or,” 
which is perhaps the source of the court’s argument that once a child 
has been given into the custody of DSS, DSS may place the child wher-
ever it sees fit.97 
 The SJC also rejected arguments under section 29, which states 
that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of this section, the court may 
make such temporary orders as may be necessary to protect the child 
and society.”98 The court held that the section is intended to safeguard 
a judge’s ability to grant temporary custody to DSS, another agency, or 
a foster family even if there is not compliance with the other provisions 
of this section.99 The justices refused to view this sentence as a grant of 
power to judges over the exercise of DSS’ custodial powers.100 
 The SJC did note, however, that “[t]he Legislature may wish to ex-
amine the statute to state more definitively the scope of a court’s author-
ity when passing on those decisions,” suggesting that the court would be 
open to greater judicial leeway to oversee such decisions if the statute 
were more explicit.101 This last sentence of the decision provides impe-
tus to increase courts’ control over DSS placement decisions.102 The SJC 
acknowledged here that the current situation is detrimental to children 
and that it would be willing to allow courts to have more control over 
DSS placement decisions.103 Given this invitation from the court, it is 
imperative to examine Isaac and Jeremy, to understand the broad impact 
                                                                                                                        
95 § 24. 
96 § 25. 
97 See §§ 24, 25; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1032. 
98 § 29; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
99 Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id.; see also Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516, 521 n.8 (Mass. 1998) (noting in 
dicta that DSS placement plans are not entitled to more weight than plans from any other 
source). 
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they have on the current legal framework, and to recognize and address 
the problems that stem from them. 
C. Applicability to the CHINS Context 
 One effect of Isaac and Jeremy is that they govern not only children 
involved with DSS through care and protection petitions, but also those 
involved through CHINS petitions; both children in need of care and 
protection and CHINS may be committed to DSS and fall within the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile court.104 Isaac and Jeremy both involved children 
who had been committed to the custody of DSS because they had been 
adjudicated in need of care and protection.105 If a child falls within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a CHINS, the court may award to 
custody to DSS; but under Isaac and Jeremy, the court cannot then review 
DSS’ placement of the child.106 The Massachusetts legislature laid out its 
goals for the juvenile court system, saying, “[t]he health and safety of the 
child shall be of paramount concern and shall include the long-term 
well-being of the child.”107 These goals are equally applicable to all chil-
dren who fall under the jurisdiction of chapter 119, including both chil-
dren in need of care and protection and children in need of services.108 
For this reason, CHINS are also subject to the provisions of ASFA.109 
II. The Adoption and Safe Families Act 
 Several provisions of ASFA govern the issue addressed in Isaac and 
Jeremy.110 The decisions rendered by various federal courts interpreting 
                                                                                                                        
104 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119 §§ 1, 39G(c) (2004) (courts may “with such conditions 
and limitations as the court may recommend, commit the child to the department of social 
services”); Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030; infra notes 106–09 and ac-
companying text. 
105 Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030. 
106 §§ 1, 39G; Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1030. 
107 § 1. 
108 See generally ch. 119. The statute also includes those children who have been adjudi-
cated delinquent and those who are youthful offenders. See §§ 52–64. Because such children 
are committed to the Department of Youth Services, however, rather than the Department of 
Social Services, they are are not controlled by Isaac and Jeremy, and are beyond the scope of 
this note. § 58. 
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2) (2000). 
110 See, e.g., §§ 672, 675, 678. The Act is an amendment to Title IV of the Social Security Act. 
See Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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the provisions of ASFA help clarify the application of ASFA to CHINS 
cases through the lens of scenarios such as those in Isaac and Jeremy.111 
A. The Statute 
 The Act gives grants to states which comply with certain require-
ments for out-of-home care for children.112 In order for a state’s chil-
dren to be eligible for benefits under ASFA, including reimbursements 
for children needing to be placed outside the home, it must submit a 
plan for review and approval by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.113 Although ASFA seems primarily to address children who 
have been abused or neglected, in Massachusetts it is equally applica-
ble to children who have been placed outside the home through a 
CHINS petition, since these children may be committed to the same 
agency, DSS, as those who have been abused or neglected.114 
 Several provisions of ASFA support the argument that Isaac and 
Jeremy should be overruled in order to comply with its mandate.115 Par-
ticularly relevant is § 672, which states that a child eligible for ASFA 
benefits may either be placed voluntarily or be subject to a judicial de-
termination that remaining in the child’s home would be contrary to 
her or his welfare.116 
 Section 675 lays out procedures for both regular review of the 
child’s placement and permanency planning for the child.117 As part of 
the state’s required case review system, it must ensure that each child’s 
status is reviewed at least once every six months.118 This review may be 
conducted either by a court or by an administrative body.119 The re-
viewing body must address the child’s safety, the continuing necessity 
for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance 
with the case plan, and the extent of progress toward reducing the 
need for out-of-home care.120 With regard to permanency planning, 
                                                                                                                        
111 See, e.g., Vt. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
789 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986); Occean v. Kearney, 123 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (S.D. Fla. 2000); 
Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 355 (D. Mass. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 
F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983). 
112 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). 
113 Id. 
114 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 39G (2004). 
115 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 672, 675, 678 (2000). 
116 § 672(a)(3). 
117 § 675(5)(B), (C). 
118 § 675(5)(B). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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ASFA’s requirements are more stringent.121 The hearing must be held 
either in a court of competent jurisdiction, such as a family or juvenile 
court, or before an administrative body which has been appointed or 
approved by a court.122 
 Lastly, § 678 provides that ASFA is not to be “construed as preclud-
ing State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the health 
and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than 
those described in section 671(a)(15)(D).”123 Although the statute 
gives states a choice between courts and agencies, nothing in the stat-
ute precludes courts from reviewing the decisions of agencies, and in 
fact, § 678 suggests exactly the opposite, that courts should review 
agency decisions.124 Congress clearly expressed an intention that courts 
should be able to make determinations regarding children’s best in-
terests; the section makes no references to deferring to the decisions of 
administrative agencies.125 This legislative intent has been embraced by 
several federal courts in cases where the decisions of administrative 
agencies were contravened by the courts.126 
B. Interpreting the Statute 
 Particularly useful in evaluating Isaac and Jeremy is a federal case, 
Lynch v. King, initially decided by the District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, and later upheld by the First Circuit.127 This case arose 
out of a class action on behalf of all children in foster care and their fos-
ter and natural families.128 The plaintiffs alleged that the Massachusetts 
foster care system did not meet federal expectations.129 The class 
claimed, among other things, that their rights under the Social Security 
                                                                                                                        
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000). 
122 Id. 
123 § 678; see also § 671(a)(15)(D). The final clause of this sentence renders it even more 
likely that the provisions of the ASFA may be applied to CHINS. See 42 U.S.C. § 678. The 
section mentioned in the statute, § 671(a)(15)(D), covers children who have been severely 
abused or whose parents have been convicted of especially violent crimes, but § 678 also 
clearly states that courts have considerable discretion in many different types of cases. See 
id.; § 671(a)(15)(D). 
124 See §§ 675(5)(B), 678. 
125 See § 678. 
126 See, e.g., Vt. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 789 F.2d at 60; Lynch, 719 F.2d at 507–08; Oc-
cean, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 625; King, 550 F. Supp. at 355. 
127 See 550 F. Supp. 325, aff’d sub nom. Lynch, 719 F.2d 504. 
128 Id. at 327 n.1. Because CHINS may be placed in foster care, this decision applies to 
them as well. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 39G (2004). 
129 King, 550 F. Supp. at 327–28. 
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Act were not being met by the Massachusetts child welfare system.130 
They sought an injunction against the Commonwealth which the court 
granted in part, noting that “the facts are that children have suffered 
unspeakable injuries to body and spirit” because “DSS is failing to com-
ply substantially with the dictates of sections 675(1), (5)(B).”131 Particu-
larly informative is the court’s order, in which it enumerated require-
ments for the mandatory “periodic reviews” by state courts.132 The court 
noted that although such reviews may be conducted either by a court or 
by an administrative agency, they must include findings regarding both 
the continuing necessity for, and appropriateness of the placement, as 
well as the extent of compliance with the case plan.133 Moreover, deci-
sions were to be made “consistent with the best interests and special 
needs of the child.”134 Such a mandate gives the reviewing body some 
discretion regarding the child’s placement.135 
 This decision was upheld on appeal.136 The First Circuit found 
that the district court had not abused its discretion.137 Specifically, the 
court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that the district court 
failed to give DSS discretion to determine how it would comply with 
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.138 The court held that it is appro-
priate for district courts to declare what is necessary to comply with 
federal spending programs; if the state wishes to retain federal funding 
then it must develop a plan for complying with federal law which will 
be subject to the approval of those courts.139 The appellate court 
agreed with the district court that children’s placements could be sub-
ject to review by the courts.140 
                                                                                                                        
130 Id. at 329. Although this case was decided prior to the enactment of ASFA, a number 
of provisions the court interpreted in its decision were contained in earlier versions of the 
Social Security Act and were not changed by the adoption of ASFA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–
677; King, 550 F. Supp. at 328 n.2. Therefore, this decision remains relevant to the interpre-
tation of ASFA. See King, 550 F. Supp. at 328 n.2. 
131 King, 550 F. Supp. at 327, 328, 353. 
132 See id. at 355. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 357. 
135 See id.; see also Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child 
Welfare Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 Md. L. Rev. 377, 
384 (1995) (“[J]uvenile courts are vested with broad dispositional powers that include the 
power to second-guess—or even direct—agency action on specific dispositional matters.”). 
136 Lynch, 719 F.2d at 506. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 513. 
139 See id. at 513–14. 
140 See id. at 506; King, 550 F. Supp. at 355. Not only did the court uphold the trial 
court’s ruling that state courts may render decisions regarding children’s placement, but it 
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 Two other federal decisions are also informative, although not 
binding on the Commonwealth.141 In Vermont Department of Social and 
Rehabilitation Services v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Vermont department filed suit because its application for federal fund-
ing under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act was de-
nied.142 When the Administration for Children and Families, under the 
auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services, reviewed 
Vermont’s system, the federal agency found that Vermont’s statutory 
scheme was not adequate to meet the requirements of federal law.143 
Specifically, Vermont law did not require frequent enough review of 
out-of-home placements.144 Also, such review only included a hearing 
in court if a party requested one, or if a court ordered one in its own 
discretion.145 Following this finding, the legislature modified the stat-
ute to provide for more frequent review and for review of the child’s 
placement by a court or a body appointed or approved by the court.146 
The court cited to the Congressional Record from the debate over the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, highlighting the testimony 
of Senator Cranston, who had argued, “‘[y]early judicial reviews of the 
child’s placement too often become perfunctory exercises with little or 
no focus upon the difficult question of what the child’s future place-
ment should be.’”147 Furthermore, the court noted that the federal 
Grant Appeals Board, in deciding whether Vermont had complied suf-
ficiently with the federal law to receive funds, had stated that simple 
judicial approval of agency decisions would be insufficient; any admin-
istrative body conducting placement hearings had to be judicially ap-
proved.148 Thus, the court upheld the decision of the Grant Appeals 
Board that Vermont was not eligible because of its failure to provide 
                                                                                                                        
also held that federal courts may oversee state agencies. See Lynch, 719 F.2d at 506. By anal-
ogy, this suggests that agencies are not immune to the decisions of courts and that state 
court decisions are equally binding on state agencies. See id. 
141 See generally Vt. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 798 F.2d 57; Occean, 123 F. Supp. 2d 618. 
142 See 798 F.2d at 59. This case, like the Massachusetts cases previously discussed, was 
decided before ASFA was passed. See id. at 57. It did, however, address provisions of the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, which preceded ASFA, similar to those in the 
current Act. See id. at 59–60. Therefore, it is still a useful tool for evaluating the Massachu-
setts scheme under ASFA. See id. 
143 See id. at 61. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 60–61. 
147 See Vt. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 798 F.2d at 63 (quoting 125 Cong. Rec. S22684 
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston)). 
148 See id. at 65 (quoting Grant Appeals Board decision). 
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adequate hearings.149 As in King, a federal court declared that there 
was a clear legislative intent that decisions regarding placement of 
children who have been removed from their homes and are in agency 
care should be overseen by courts.150 
 Lastly, and most recently, in a Florida case, Occean v. Kearney, the 
plaintiff was a foster child whose foster care benefits were summarily 
terminated without his having been afforded notice or an opportunity 
to be heard.151 The plaintiff had been removed from his home and 
placed in foster care, and was later transferred to a behavioral modifi-
cation facility, where he wished to remain until he completed his 
GED.152 On his eighteenth birthday, however, his case was closed and 
he was told to pack and get on a bus with only a few of his belongings 
and fifty dollars.153 The district court held that because the plaintiff 
had not been given a hearing prior to his dismissal from the facility, his 
right to procedural due process had been violated, and that there was 
an affirmative obligation placed on states that accept federal funds to 
provide such procedural protections.154 The court’s holding effectively 
stated that children who have been in the custody of a state agency are 
entitled to procedural protection.155 
 Taken together, these cases indicate that the federal government 
intends for courts to have the authority to oversee agency decisions.156 
Since judicial review of agency decisions is not the practice in Massa-
chusetts, its laws must be updated to bring the Commonwealth into 
compliance with federal mandates and to better serve the children in 
DSS custody.157 
III. The Need for Change 
 There is a “wide gap in Massachusetts between the legal standards 
for the care and protection of children and the actual practices of the 
                                                                                                                        
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 62–65. 
151 123 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See id. at 623, 625 (“When limitations exist on agency discretion to terminate or ex-
tend benefits, procedural due process must be afforded.”). 
155 See id. 
156 See discussion supra notes 127–55 and accompanying text. 
157 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672, 675, 678 (2000); Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 
(Mass. 1995); Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995); Carrie Leonetti, 
In the Interests of Children: The Role of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services in Private 
Custody Proceedings, 10 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 67, 92 (2002). 
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Department of Social Services.”158 This gap may stem from courts giv-
ing cursory review to the actions of DSS, which has sometimes circum-
vented the requirements of the law, thereby creating a dangerous com-
bination for the children whom DSS and the courts are intended to 
protect.159 Attempts to mold the relationship between the juvenile 
court and DSS into the confines of a traditional court-agency relation-
ship further widen the gap.160 In contrast to normal agency-court rela-
tionships, DSS and the juvenile court share the mission of protecting 
children’s interests and therefore should not be set in opposition to 
each other.161 When a child welfare agency is performing its mission of 
protecting children’s interests adequately, then there is little need for 
courts to overrule its decisions.162 When such an agency places chil-
dren where it is convenient for it to do so, however, and not necessarily 
where the children’s needs dictate they be placed, then courts must 
have the power to order appropriate placements.163 The federal gov-
ernment, through ASFA, has agreed with this formulation.164 As such, 
Massachusetts should bring its CHINS law into compliance with ASFA 
to avoid the risk of losing additional federal funding. The need for 
change is particularly apparent in light of the disproportionately large 
number of children of color in DSS care, who are therefore inordi-
nately affected by Isaac and Jeremy.165 
A. Disproportionate Impact on Children of Color 
 “Child welfare is not usually viewed as a civil rights issue,” but per-
haps it should be.166 DSS itself states that “Black children and Hispanic 
children are over-represented at all stages in the DSS system.”167 Ac-
cording to the 2000 Census, 79% of children in Massachusetts were 
                                                                                                                        
158 Leonetti, supra note 157, at 92. 
159 See id. at 68, 93. 
160 See Boyer, supra note 135, at 379. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 384. 
163 See id.; see also Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Mass. 1995) (noting that 
DSS allowed the child to continue to live in a hospital while it waited for a more suitable 
placement at least partly because of budgetary constraints). 
164 42 U.S.C. § 678 (2000). 
165 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2000) (laying out requirements for states to be eligible to re-
ceive payments under the act); Quarterly Report, supra note 33, at 3. 
166 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 171, 171. 
167 Quarterly Report, supra note 33, at 3. 
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white, 7% black, 4% Asian, and 11% of Hispanic origin.168 Of the 9203 
children in DSS placement at the end of the second quarter of 2007, 
60% were white, 18% black, 1% Asian, and 26% of Hispanic origin.169 
From these numbers it is apparent that both black and Hispanic chil-
dren are disproportionately represented among children in DSS care. 
Although the data addresses the DSS population as a whole, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the same disparities apply to CHINS.170 
 Given that Isaac and Jeremy authorize DSS to place children in its 
care anywhere the agency sees fit, whether or not that decision is ap-
propriate to their particular needs, and given that more children of 
color are involved with DSS through CHINS, these decisions must dis-
proportionately affect such children.171 Although the statistics cannot 
explain why children of color are so over-represented in the DSS popu-
lation, this disproportionate impact is a primary reason that Isaac and 
Jeremy should be overruled either legislatively or judicially.172 
B. Updating Massachusetts Law to Comply with ASFA 
 The other reason Isaac and Jeremy should be overruled is that Mas-
sachusetts has been subject to federal review under ASFA to determine 
whether or not its child welfare system is in compliance with federal 
regulations, and it has not performed spectacularly.173 Among the in-
dicators sought in such reviews are judicial determinations that: (1) 
there will be state responsibility for placement and care of the child 
after a court order has verified the need to remove the child; (2) the 
family has been preserved where appropriate; and (3) a permanency 
                                                                                                                        
168 Kids Count Census Data Online, Race of Children by Age Group in the 2000 
Census, Analysis of Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census Summary File 1 
(tbl.P12A–P12G), cited in Quarterly Report, supra note 33, at 3. 
169 Id. at 1, 3. 
170 See id. at 3. 
171 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041; Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 
1995). 
172 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033; Quarterly Report, supra 
note 33, at 3; infra notes 192–242 and accompanying text. 
173 See IV-E Review, supra note 31, at 1, 9; CFSR, supra note 32, at 11. Under the IV-E re-
view, whose purpose was to determine whether Massachusetts had complied sufficiently with 
federal law to receive benefits under Title IV-E, nine out of eighty cases sampled were de-
termined to have been handled erroneously and therefore the state was not found to be in 
substantial compliance. IV-E Review, supra note 31, at 1. The state was required to return 
$120,580 in foster care payments and to pay $56,342 in administrative costs, which the 
state’s children can ill afford, as well as to develop a Program Improvement Plan. See id. at 1, 
2, 9. 
258 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:239 
plan has been finalized.174 Requiring court oversight of all of these dif-
ferent decisions assumes that courts may review agency decisions for 
more than just abuse of discretion.175 In fact, in its initial review by the 
federal government, one of Massachusetts’ weaknesses was that its case 
review system was deemed not to be in substantial compliance because 
permanency hearings were found to be brief and generally inade-
quate.176 This finding suggests that the federal government envisions a 
more active role for state courts in placement decisions.177 The review 
stated that Massachusetts “courts often had extremely brief and per-
functory permanency hearings that did not adequately address the 
ASFA requirements for these hearings.”178 It also mentioned that the 
way in which judges view the permanency hearing, which may be in-
ferred from the statement that “brief” hearings are occurring, may be a 
barrier to substantive and effective hearings.179 
 From these findings, it is apparent that court practices for chil-
dren in DSS care need to change.180 Given the grave nature of the de-
cisions being made, it is imperative that they be given due considera-
tion.181 Although DSS has the opportunity to make these decisions 
itself, the courts should have the chance to review them in order to 
                                                                                                                        
174 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (c) (2007). 
175 See id. Although neither Isaac nor Jeremy mentions the issue, the notion of separation 
of powers underlies both decisions. See generally Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1034; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 
at 1029. Judicial scrutiny of agency decisions, however, is presupposed by any number of 
different people and entities. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (c); supra notes 117–150 and 
accompanying text. One author has said that separation of powers on the state level is of a 
different quality than on the federal level, particularly since the concept originated in state 
constitutions, many of which predate the federal constitution. See Jonathan Feldman, Separa-
tion of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of 
Positive Government, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1057, 1066 & n.46 (1993). In fact, states deliberately 
sought to incorporate judicial review into their systems of government because they saw it as 
an important method of restraining legislative behavior. Id. Those who presume the legality 
of judicial oversight of agency decisions are presumably relying on the logic that such deci-
sions are permissible under the state, as opposed to federal, doctrines of separation of pow-
ers. See id. at 1067. 
176 See CFSR, supra note 32, at 2, 11. 
177 See id. 
178 Id. at 11. 
179 See id. at 33. 
180 See id. at 11; IV-E Review, supra note 31, at 9. 
181 See, e.g., Wen, supra note 5 (describing the death of Dontel Jeffers in his foster 
mother’s home after he had been placed with her by DSS, despite his grandmother’s will-
ingness and desire to care for him). 
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ensure that DSS’ decisions have not been driven by considerations un-
related to children’s best interests.182 
IV. Remedies 
 Given the negative effects of Isaac and Jeremy, it is apparent that 
steps must be taken not simply to comply with the federal scheme, but 
also to guarantee equal treatment of all children in the system.183 Since 
negative effects are stemming from these decisions, neither the courts 
nor DSS are living up to the mandate that the child’s health and safety 
are supposed to come first.184 Although the problem is complex, there 
may be some simple remedies.185 In Isaac and Jeremy the court read the 
statutes as preventing courts from reviewing DSS’ placement decisions 
except in cases of abuse of discretion.186 This reading was not the only 
possible interpretation; the SJC could have interpreted the statutes dif-
ferently and should take the opportunity to revisit these decisions in 
the future.187 The SJC noted that it might be open to taking a different 
view of things in the future if the statutes were amended, to give courts 
more clear authority in such cases.188 The legislature should accept the 
court’s invitation and address the problem by amending the relevant 
statutes to give the juvenile court power to oversee DSS placement de-
cisions.189 Massachusetts is not the only state to face issues of conflict 
between courts and child welfare agencies, but other states have re-
solved cases like Isaac and Jeremy by granting courts more authority to 
prevent tragedies such as the death of Dontel Jeffers.190 Massachusetts 
should draw inspiration from these other states.191 
                                                                                                                        
182 See, e.g., Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1035 (noting that DSS refused to place the child in ac-
cordance with the recommendation of both his psychiatrist and his GAL at least in part 
because it did not want to fund the placement). 
183 See supra notes 158–182 and accompanying text. 
184 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 1 (2004); Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 
1036 (Mass. 1995); Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (Mass. 1995); supra notes 
36–103, 158–182 and accompanying text. 
185 See infra notes 192–258 and accompanying text. 
186 See Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1039; Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
187 See infra notes 192–230 and accompanying text. 
188 See Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033. 
189 See id.; infra notes 231–42 and accompanying text. 
190 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-820(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating 
that courts may order specific placements for children in need of assistance); Ellement & 
Wen, supra note 7. 
191 See infra notes 243–258 and accompanying text. 
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A. Overruling Isaac and Jeremy 
1. Case Law since Isaac and Jeremy 
 Since the passage of ASFA, relatively few Massachusetts cases have 
addressed court oversight of DSS placements of children in its care.192 
Of the few, the most notable are Adoption of Hugo and In re Angela.193 
Hugo addressed a boy with special needs who had been cared for in a 
foster home for a significant period.194 DSS determined that he should 
be moved to the home of his aunt in another state, since she had 
raised a son who had disabilities similar to Hugo’s, despite the fact that 
Hugo was very attached to his foster mother and had been calling her 
“mommy.”195 Although the SJC grudgingly affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to remove Hugo to his aunt’s care, it noted in dicta that 
a plan proposed by DSS [is not] entitled to any special weight, 
even if an alternative plan does not implicate the fitness of the 
biological parents. A judge should provide an “even handed” 
assessment of all the facts surrounding both the department’s 
plan and any competing custody or adoption plan.196 
The SJC suggested here that DSS decisions about children’s placement 
are less binding on courts than Isaac and Jeremy say they are.197 The 
court, however, did not mention Isaac or Jeremy.198 The ambiguity cre-
ated by the inconsistency between Hugo and Isaac and Jeremy leaves 
open the question of how this decision fits within the structure the ear-
lier cases created, or even whether they were tacitly overruled.199 
 In Angela, the court held that prior to continuing an out-of-home 
placement for an additional six months in a CHINS case, the judge must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing.200 At this hearing, the court must find 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the purposes of the disposition 
have not been accomplished and that continuing the placement would 
be reasonably likely to further these purposes.201 Angela appears to give 
                                                                                                                        
192 See, e.g., In re Angela, 833 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Mass. 2005); Adoption of Hugo, 700 
N.E.2d 516, 521 n.8 (Mass. 1998). 
193 See Angela, 833 N.E.2d 575; Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516. 
194 See Hugo, 700 N.E.2d at 518, 519. 
195 See id. at 519. 
196 Id. at 520, 521 n.8. 
197 See id. at 521 n.8. 
198 See id. at 516. 
199 See Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516. 
200 Angela, 833 N.E.2d at 577. 
201 Id. 
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courts the power not only to oversee DSS’ placement of a child but also 
the power to continue the placement.202 In fact, the court distinguished 
CHINS proceedings from other commitment proceedings because the 
juvenile court has control over the child’s treatment, whereas in other 
proceedings the person is committed to an agency or department which 
then determines the person’s treatment.203 
 As in Hugo, the court did not mention Isaac or Jeremy in its opin-
ion.204 The failure to mention these decisions suggests that the Angela 
court implicitly distinguished Isaac and Jeremy by holding that CHINS 
commitments are different from other types of commitment.205 Failure 
to mention the earlier decisions raises the question of whether the SJC 
was trying to tacitly overrule them.206 Given that the SJC has not explic-
itly addressed the decisions, they must be handled in a more direct 
manner; they remain dangerous precedents that may impede the 
treatment of children who are supposedly being served by DSS.207 
2. Statutory Developments Since Isaac and Jeremy 
 Section one of chapter 119 of the Massachusetts General Laws, 
which addresses “Protection and Care of Children, and Proceedings 
Against Them,” states: 
In all matters and decisions by [DSS], the policy of [DSS], as 
applied to children in its care and protection or children who 
receive its services, shall be to define the best interests of the 
child as that which shall include, but not be limited to . . . the 
child’s fitness, readiness, abilities and de-velopmental levels; 
the particulars of the service plan de-signed to meet the needs 
of the child within his current placement . . . and the effective-
ness, suitability and ade-quacy of the services provided and of 
placement decisions, including the progress of the child or 
children therein.208 
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This paragraph was added in 1999, after Isaac and Jeremy had been de-
cided.209 Therefore the SJC’s decisions in these cases were rendered 
without the benefit of the guidance the Assembly provided in section 
one.210 In light of the new language, Isaac and Jeremy should be over-
ruled to effect the affirmative duty imposed on DSS, and to provide the 
courts with the authority to enforce that duty.211 
3. A Different Reading of Existing Statutes 
 Even without the benefit of the rewritten section one, a different 
interpretation of pre-existing sections could also support the argument 
for judicial rejection of Isaac and Jeremy.212 The court based its decisions 
primarily on sections of chapter 119, which addresses care and protec-
tion of children, as well as proceedings against them.213 Sections 24 and 
25 present particularly useful examples of provisions the court could 
have interpreted differently.214 Section 24 states, “the court may issue 
an emergency order transferring custody of the child to the depart-
ment or to a licensed child care agency or [other qualified] individ-
ual.”215 This language seems to grant the court the freedom to choose 
which of the enumerated options it prefers for the individual child ap-
pearing before it.216 Section 25 is similarly phrased and states “the 
court may allow the child to be placed in the care of some suitable per-
son or licensed agency providing foster care for children or the child 
may be committed to the custody of the department.”217 
 The court noted in Jeremy that these two provisions represent al-
ternatives for judges, but focused on the section which allows DSS to 
decide when a child needs to be placed in a residential facility. 218 That 
section does not state that only DSS may order such a placement.219 In 
fact, another section provides courts with even more options, stating 
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. . . .”). 
219 See § 32. 
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that once a child has been adjudicated in need of care and protection, 
the court may “subject to such conditions and limitations as it may prescribe, 
transfer temporary legal custody to” a foster home, an agency or or-
ganization, or DSS.220 The SJC, however, refused to read this provision 
as giving the court power to determine the child’s specific place-
ment.221 The court’s only explanation for this holding was that this 
statute “logically [cannot] be read to override a reasonable placement 
decision made by the department for a child in its temporary cus-
tody.”222 Given the additions to section 1 since Isaac and Jeremy were 
handed down, the definition of reasonable may need to be adjusted.223 
 Lastly, the court rejected arguments under the section which states 
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of this section, the court may make 
such temporary orders as may be necessary to protect the child and 
society.”224 The court held that this provision merely served to bolster a 
court’s authority to commit the child to DSS, not to give judges power 
to oversee DSS decisions regarding the child.225 
 Although the SJC relied on statutory provisions relating to care 
and protection proceedings in Isaac and Jeremy, these provisions may be 
analogized to CHINS cases. The CHINS statute lists persons and or-
ganizations, similar to those in the sections on care and protection, to 
which the child may be committed, also subject to such limitations and 
conditions as the court sees fit.226 
 Despite the significant amount of leeway given to the court by the 
statutes, the SJC declined to accept the task of evaluating whether DSS’ 
decisions were appropriate.227 The court also refused to make placement 
decisions, leaving them to the whims and hazards of DSS’ discretion.228 
Despite its unwillingness to act affirmatively, the court encouraged the 
legislature to make changes.229 As the court still refuses to reexamine 
these decisions, legislation seems a more likely venue for change.230 
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B. Living up to the Mandate of Jeremy: Legislative Change 
 At the end of its decision in Jeremy, the SJC stated that legislative 
action should be considered to remedy any problems caused by the 
court’s self-imposed restraint.231 Because the SJC refused to allow 
courts to select appropriate placements for juveniles in DSS custody, 
including CHINS, who need to enter residential facilities or foster 
care, courts can avoid taking responsibility for the outcomes of DSS 
decision-making.232 This lack of accountability renders children in DSS 
custody vulnerable and leaves them with very little recourse.233 
 An example of possible legislative action comes from the Pew 
Commission on Children in Foster Care’s report.234 The report detailed 
recommendations for legislatures to take in addressing the nationwide 
deficiencies in the foster care system.235 One of the Commission’s pri-
mary recommendations was that courts should take the lead in imple-
menting reforms and improvements.236 More specifically, the Commis-
sion recommended that there be strong and effective collaboration 
between courts and child welfare agencies.237 Given the SJC’s unwilling-
ness to take on any tasks that have not been explicitly and unquestiona-
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bly delegated to it, the most useful way to implement this recommenda-
tion would be through legislation.238 
 Some courts have been given broad powers to overrule or even 
command agencies with regard to dispositions.239 Such a grant of 
power ensures that ultimate authority rests with the court.240 Since the 
child’s interests are the primary factors for consideration in any case 
the juvenile court hears, a certain amount of judicial supervision of 
agency decisions should be expected and desired.241 This proposition 
is strengthened by the fact that in delinquency dispositions, a court 
may direct the child’s placement.242 
C. Lessons from Other States 
 Not all states have refused to allow court oversight of child welfare 
agency decisions.243 For example, a Maryland statute states that, 
[a]fter a [Children in Need of Assistance] disposition, when 
the court has ordered a specific placement of a child, a local 
department may remove the child from that placement prior 
to a hearing only if: (1) Removal is required to protect the 
child from serious immediate danger; (2) The child's contin-
ued placement in the court-ordered placement is contrary to 
the welfare of the child; or (3) The person or agency with 
whom the child is placed has requested the immediate removal 
of the child.244 
This statute demonstrates that it is possible for courts to oversee agency 
placement decisions.245 Although the statute provides that in certain 
cases an agency may unilaterally remove a child from a court-ordered 
placement, it normally requires that there be a hearing first.246 Thus, 
the statute provides for significant court oversight of children’s place-
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ments.247 Furthermore, Maryland law also provides that if a court de-
termines that a child is in need of assistance, the court may “[c]ommit 
the child on terms the court considers appropriate to the custody of 
. . . a local department, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
or both, including designation of the type of facility where the child is to be 
placed.”248 The statute goes on to list a host of other actions the court 
may take, showing that the Maryland courts have a much broader 
range of options than those in Massachusetts.249 Had the trial courts in 
Isaac and Jeremy had such a range of options, perhaps those two boys 
would not have wound up in placements so wildly inappropriate to 
their needs.250 
 In Wisconsin, the statute simply declares that, “[t]he court has ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of protec-
tion or services which can be ordered by the court.”251 The legislature 
intended for courts to oversee children’s placements and indeed gave 
the courts great leeway in making orders regarding these children.252 
 Georgia explicitly gives judges power, not only to place a child in a 
wide variety of settings, but also to 
conduct sua sponte a judicial review of the current placement 
plan being provided to said child. After its review the court 
may order the division to comply with the current placement 
plan, order the division to devise a new placement plan within 
available division resources, or make any other order relative to 
placement or custody outside the Department of Human Re-
sources as the court finds to be in the best interest of the 
child.253 
This statute gives the court broad authority not only to select the ap-
propriate placement for a child, but also to review that placement as 
needed, a particularly useful function if the Department of Human 
Resources is not placing children in appropriate settings.254 
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 In Nebraska, the Department of Health and Human Services, or 
any other person or agency to which the court grants custody may de-
termine the placement of the child as well as what other services the 
child should receive.255 The statute also grants the courts authority to 
order the Department to propose a plan for the care of the child, and 
“modify the plan, order that an alternative plan be developed, or im-
plement another plan that is in the juvenile's best interests.”256 
 It is apparent from these examples that other states have found 
that allowing courts to oversee the decisions of relevant agencies better 
serves children.257 Given the example set by these states, Massachusetts 
should follow it by either enacting legislation similar to that in Mary-
land, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Georgia, or through common law by 
overruling Isaac and Jeremy.258 
Conclusion 
 The SJC’s decisions in Care and Protection of Isaac and Care and Pro-
tection of Jeremy do not serve the best interests of children who are in 
DSS care through a CHINS petition. In order to comply with federal 
law and to avoid losing further funding for the state’s children, they 
should be reversed. Because there are a disproportionate number of 
children of color involved with DSS and therefore in the CHINS sys-
tem, the decisions are having a disproportionate impact on these chil-
dren, further bolstering the need for change. Given the state statutes 
enacted since the decisions were rendered, Isaac and Jeremy should be 
reconsidered to ensure compliance with current statutes. The deci-
sions could have been decided differently under existing state law and 
could therefore be judicially overruled. They might also be legislatively 
overruled, as the SJC suggested at the end of Jeremy. The practices of 
other states may provide useful models on which to base changes in 
Massachusetts. Ultimately, whatever means is used to bring about 
changes, they must be made in order for DSS and the juvenile courts 
of Massachusetts to live up to the mandate laid for them: serving the 
health and safety of the child.259 
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